Borg’s Minimalism and the Problem of Paradox by Pinder, Mark
Mark Pinder 
University of Bristol 
Mark.Pinder@bristol.ac.uk 
Borg’s Minimalism and the Problem of 
Paradox 
Abstract: According to Emma Borg, minimalism is (roughly) the view that natural 
language sentences have truth conditions, and that these truth conditions are fully 
determined by syntactic structure and lexical content. A principal motivation for her 
brand of minimalism is that it coheres well with the popular view that semantic 
competence is underpinned by the cognition of a minimal semantic theory. In this 
paper, I argue that the liar paradox presents a serious problem for this principal mo-
tivation. Two lines of response to the problem are discussed, and difficulties facing 
those responses are raised. I close by issuing a challenge: to construe the principal 
motivation for Borg’s version of minimalism in such a way so as to avoid the prob-
lem of paradox. 
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0. Introduction 
According to Emma Borg (2004, 2012), minimalism is the view that 
each well-formed declarative sentence of natural language has a lexico-
syntactically determined truth condition. That is, each such sentence has 
a truth condition, and such truth conditions are fully determined by syn-
tactic structure and lexical content. A principal motivation for Borg’s 
minimalism is roughly that it coheres well with a popular, cognitive ac-
count of semantic competence, which I call cognitivism, according to 
which semantic competence is underpinned by the cognition of a mini-
mal semantic theory. In this paper, I shall raise and discuss a problem 
concerning this principal motivation for Borg’s version of minimalism. 
The problem – which I call the problem of paradox – arises by con-
sideration of the liar paradox. Consider the liar sentence, : 
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 is not true. 
Without loss of generality, we can treat  as a sentence of English – per-
haps, for example, by treating the letter “” as an abbreviation of the def-
inite description: 
the first centrally aligned sentence in the paper “Borg’s 
Minimalism and the Problem of Paradox” 
Intuitively,  is a subject-predicate sentence whose subject denotes , 
and whose predicate is satisfied by whatever is not true. As such, we 
might initially expect the truth condition of  to be characterised thus: 
(T) “ is not true” is true if, and only if,  is not true. 
However, (T) quickly leads to a contradiction (by substitution of co-
referring terms and by considering cases). So, on pain of inconsistency, 
(T) must be rejected. 
Ultimately, almost every theorist of meaning shall have to say some-
thing about the liar paradox. And, in the literature, there are a plethora of 
proposed solutions to the paradox which the theorist of meaning may 
make use of. But, as we shall see, Borg’s minimalist faces a very par-
ticular problem in light of the paradox.1 Roughly, as a result of what I 
take to be the principal motivation for the view, Borg’s minimalist is un-
able to incorporate proposed solutions to the liar paradox into her se-
mantic theory. If the problem of paradox can be upheld, then the conse-
quences for Borg’s minimalism are serious: the principal motivation is 
undermined. 
Before proceeding, let me make a brief caveat. In general, minimalism 
is understood to be the view that there is very little context sensitivity in 
the semantics of natural language. For example, Cappelen and Lepore 
                                        
1  This being said, the problem of paradox might be extended to related views, such 
as those of Larson and Segal (1995), Laurence (1996), and to views that ground 
meaning in speakers’ causal states (e.g. Davies 1987, Evans 1981), and speakers’ 
dispositional states (e.g. Field 1977). 
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state that the “most salient feature of semantic minimalism is that it rec-
ognizes few context sensitive expressions” (2005: 2). 
Correspondingly, Borg presents her brand of minimalism as being in 
competition with a variety of views that permit, in one way or another, 
more context sensitivity than her own. (The views are, in Borg’s termi-
nology, indexicalism, contextualism, relativism, occasionalism.) How-
ever, in the present paper, I shall not have anything to say about this par-
ticular debate. The problem of paradox arises not as a result of how little 
context sensitivity Borg’s minimalism permits, but rather as a result of 
the particular way in which it allegedly coheres with the cognitivist ac-
count of semantic competence. 
The plan of the paper, then, is as follows. In Section 1, I sketch Borg’s 
minimalism and outline the principal motivation. The latter is cashed out 
in terms of Borg’s commitment to cognitivism and to what I call the 
meaning hypothesis. In Section 2, I outline the problem of paradox: 
roughly, there is a straightforward argument from the liar paradox to the 
rejection of the meaning hypothesis. If the problem can be upheld, the 
principal motivation is thereby undermined. In Sections 3-4, I raise diffi-
culties for two possible lines of response to the problem of paradox. I 
close in Section 5 by issuing a challenge: to construe the meaning hy-
pothesis in such a way so as to avoid the problem of paradox. 
1. Borg’s Minimalism and the Principal Motivation 
Borg characterises her brand of minimalism, henceforth BM, in terms of 
four definitional claims. I quote: 
(i) Semantic content for well-formed declarative sentences is truth-
evaluable content. 
(ii) Semantic content for a sentence is fully determined by its syntactic 
structure and lexical content: the meaning of a sentence is exhausted 
by the meaning of its parts and their mode of composition. 
(iii) There are only a limited number of context-sensitive expressions in 
natural language. 
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(iv) Recovery of semantic content is possible without access to current 
speaker intentions (crudely, grasp of semantic content involves ‘word 
reading’ not ‘mindreading’). 
(Borg 2012: 4-5) 
Claims (i) and (ii) are taken by Borg (2012: 5f) to represent a formal ap-
proach to semantics. Roughly, the idea is that: the sentences, expressions 
and words of natural language have well-defined syntactic properties; 
words are assigned lexical contents; and that each sentence has a truth 
condition that can be derived from its syntactic structure and the lexical 
contents of its constituent words. 
BM permits a small amount of lexico-syntactically driven context sen-
sitivity. The details shall not concern us here.2 We may simply note that 
claims (iii) and (iv) provide constraints on the context sensitivity permit-
ted by BM. Claim (iii) tells us that there are few context sensitive ex-
pressions in natural language, and claim (iv) places constraints on the 
features of context that can be appealed to: context sensitive expressions 
cannot demand an appeal to a speaker’s intentions. 
It shall prove useful to introduce a little terminology at this juncture. 
First, let a semantic theory for L be a description of what the sentences, 
expressions and words of L mean(-in-L). Second, let a semantic theory 
be correct just in case it accurately describes those meanings. (Roughly, 
“la neige” means(-in-French) snow is accurate, “la neige” means(-in-
French) grass is inaccurate.) Third, let a minimal semantic theory for L
be a semantic theory for L that vindicates claims (i)-(iv) above, in the 
sense that: 
(i') it yields a truth condition for each well-formed declarative sen-
tence in L. 
(ii') it contains an axiom for each lexical item (roughly, word) in L 
and an axiom for each mode of composition of L, such that the 
truth condition for any given sentence of L is entailed by the 
axioms for the constituents of that sentence and their mode of 
composition. 
                                        
2  See Borg (2004: 147-208). 
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(iii') there are no appeals to context (which can be understood as a 
finite, ordered, sequence of parameters), except perhaps in the 
axioms for a few lexical items of L. 
(iv') there are no context parameters for a speaker’s intentions. 
With this terminology to hand, we can concisely characterise BM as fol-
lows: 
Borg’s minimalism (BM): the correct semantic theory for a natural 
language is a minimal semantic theory. 
I shall henceforth take this formulation of BM to be canonical. 
I take the principal motivation for BM to be roughly that BM coheres 
well with a popular, cognitive account of semantic competence. I call the 
account in question cognitivism. Roughly, cognitivism states that seman-
tic competence is underpinned by the modular cognition of a minimal 
semantic theory.3,4 More precisely: semantic competence with a lan-
guage, L, is accounted for by the postulation of a module – called the 
semantic module – within the speaker’s language faculty, which realises, 
encodes, processes in line with, or stands in some other suitable relation 
to, a minimal semantic theory for L. The precise relation in which the 
semantic module stands to the cognised minimal semantic theory is not 
stipulated; but, for the sake of concreteness, let us make an assumption 
about how the relation is to be cashed out.5
To this end, let me introduce the idea of a canonical derivation proce-
dure. A canonical derivation procedure is a recursive algorithm with 
which a minimal semantic theory for a language, L, is equipped. The al-
gorithm tells us which inferential steps are taken in deriving the truth 
condition for any sentence of L from the axioms for the constituents of 
that sentence and their mode of composition. Let us say that a speaker 
                                        
3  Borg understands modules as introduced by Fodor (1983); the details shall not 
concern us here. 
4  See Borg (2004: 74-146), and e.g. Larson and Segal (1995). 
5  I assume that talk of cognising a semantic theory is intended to be cognitively 
real. The problem of paradox relies on this assumption, but not on the particular 
way that I cash out the relation in the text. 
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cognises a particular minimal semantic theory for L, TL, when: her se-
mantic module takes, as input, representations of sentences of L; the 
module implements the canonical derivation procedure of TL, processing 
inputs to yield, as outputs, truth conditions of input sentences. 
That, in brief outline, is cognitivism: a speaker has semantic compe-
tence with L just in case she cognises, in the above sense (or so we are 
assuming), a minimal semantic theory for L. There are numerous subtle-
ties and complications that have gone unmentioned, but the above pic-
ture shall serve our present purposes. In what follows, I assume for the 
sake of argument that cognitivism is correct. 
I cash out the principal motivation, that BM coheres well with cogni-
tivism, as follows: cognitivism leads to a promising hypothesis, which I 
call the meaning hypothesis; and cognitivism and the meaning hypothe-
sis jointly imply BM.6 Let us turn to the meaning hypothesis. 
First, see that there is a substantial question to ask about the relation 
between semantic competence and linguistic meaning.7 For example, 
there is no conceptual, a priori, or necessary, requirement that the cogni-
tive mechanism that underpins speakers’ linguistic abilities involves (in 
one way or another) accurate specifications of what linguistic expres-
sions mean: facts about meaning need not reflect or depend on any given 
story about speakers’ cognitive mechanisms. As Gross says, one need 
not commit oneself “to the convergence of the meaning-stating project 
and the project of accounting for semantic competence” (Gross 2006: 
64). However, according to the meaning hypothesis, the cognised se-
mantic theory is (for whatever reason) to be identified with the correct
semantic theory. Borg, for example, says that 
[…] an interpretation is the right/wrong one if it matches/fails to match the 
one generated by the semantic theory actually possessed by ordinary speak-
ers. (Borg 2010: 35) 
                                        
6  Borg does not explicitly characterise the motivation in this (or any other) way. 
However, it is clear that access to the explanatorily potent meaning hypothesis is 
central to Borg’s motivations. See Borg (2004: 74-146; 2012: 11f, 48-72). 
7  See e.g. Gross (2006: 63f), and Patterson’s (2009) critique of ‘epistemic imma-
nence’. 
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/9/15 7:04 PM
Borg’s Minimalism and the Problem of Paradox 213 
Let us characterise the meaning hypothesis more formally as follows. 
The meaning hypothesis: the correct semantic theory for a natural 
language, L, is the semantic theory cognised by speakers of L. 
Notice immediately that, as I said above, cognitivism and the meaning 
hypothesis jointly imply BM. So, as Borg endorses cognitivism and the 
meaning hypothesis, her commitment to BM is inevitable.  
Is the meaning hypothesis a promising hypothesis? It may seem so:  
it is a simple, natural, and plausible extension of cognitivism. Most im-
portantly, however, the meaning hypothesis is explanatorily potent; it is 
a theoretically fruitful hypothesis. 
Let me provide three examples of this explanatory potency. 
(E1) The learnability of language. A well-known line of thought 
says that natural languages are learnable because (give or take 
a few exceptions) the meaning of every sentence of a given 
natural language can be ascertained from the meaning of  
a finite number of lexical items and the grammatical modes of 
composition. Given the meaning hypothesis, it seems both that 
we get this putative explanation for free, and that we see why
this putative explanation is correct. Cognised semantic theories 
are minimal semantic theories, so they yield truth conditions 
just from axioms that govern the lexical items and modes of 
composition (since they vindicate (i') and (ii')), and they must 
be recursively axiomatised (as we are finite creatures). If cog-
nised semantic theories are correct semantic theories, then the 
compositionality of language (give or take a few exceptions), 
and thus the learnability of language, was always inevitable. 
(E2) Non-cancellable content. Linguistic exchanges appear to have 
non-cancellable content, i.e. conveyed content that cannot be 
cancelled without commitment to a contradiction. For example, 
I can say “I said I would come to tea, not that I’d come on 
time” without self-contradiction, but not “I said I would come 
to tea, not that I would come to tea”. It is often held that (lit-
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eral, linguistic, truth-conditional) meaning can play the role of 
non-cancellable content. If we accept the meaning hypothesis, 
we get this account for free. In interpreting a given sentence, 
there is a particular content that, whatever the linguistic ex-
change, is output by the semantic module. As such content is 
used to interpret an uttered sentence, we would expect it to be 
non-cancellable from the outset. So the meaning hypothesis 
provides a notion of meaning that plays the role of non-
cancellable content in linguistic exchanges. 
(E3) Linguistic data and grounding. It is not immediately clear how 
to use linguistic data to construct and confirm a semantic theo-
ry; and it is not immediately clear what makes the correct se-
mantic theory correct. Given the meaning hypothesis, however, 
these issues can be resolved. Linguistic data must be used to 
construct a semantic theory that mirrors the cognised semantic 
theory, a semantic theory is confirmed when we have sufficient 
evidence that it mirrors the cognised semantic theory, and the 
so-confirmed semantic theory is correct because (by the mean-
ing hypothesis) the cognised semantic theory is the correct se-
mantic theory. 
There appears to be a good reason, then, for the cognitivist to make the 
meaning hypothesis: in particular, it furnishes her with a number of ex-
planatory benefits.  
Here, then, is my official characterisation of the principal motivation 
for BM. 
The principal motivation for BM: the meaning hypothesis is a prom-
ising hypothesis, as it is explanatorily potent, as shown by (E1)-(E3); 
and the meaning hypothesis implies BM. 
It is roughly in this sense that I say that BM coheres well with cogni-
tivism: given cognitivism, there is a promising hypothesis that implies 
BM. We now turn to the problem facing this principal motivation. 
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2. The Problem of Paradox 
Earlier, we introduced the liar sentence, : 
 is not true. 
We noted that, initially, one might expect the truth condition of  to be 
characterised as follows: 
(T) “ is not true” is true if, and only if,  is not true. 
However, (T) quickly yields a contradiction and must, on pain of incon-
sistency, be rejected. 
In the present section, I outline the problem that the liar paradox poses 
to BM (or, more precisely, to its principle motivation). Let me begin 
with a concise statement of the problem. (I remind the reader that we are 
assuming cognitivism.) 
The problem of paradox: the liar paradox shows that speakers cog-
nise inconsistent minimal semantic theories (i.e. they yield some-
thing like (T) as a truth condition for ). As inconsistent semantic 
theories cannot be true,8 and as correct semantic theories are true, it 
follows that the meaning hypothesis is false. This directly under-
mines the principal motivation for BM. 
Notice the following about this formulation of the problem: the liar par-
adox is taken to show us something about the cognised semantic theory, 
i.e. that it is inconsistent, but it is not taken to show us anything about 
the correct semantic theory. That is, the liar paradox is taken to tell us 
something about how language is processed, not about linguistic mean-
ing. The only assumption made about the correct semantic theory is that 
it is true. This is important: there are a plethora of proposed solutions to 
the liar paradox that a theorist of meaning might hope to make use of in 
constructing a true semantic theory. The particular difficulty for Borg is 
                                        
8  I put dialetheism aside for present purposes. 
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that these solutions cannot be read back into the cognitive mechanism 
that underpins semantic competence. 
The point deserves spelling out. First, consider the theorist of mean-
ing. Her aim is, in part, to describe the semantic properties – i.e. the 
meanings, truth conditions, etc. – of linguistic expressions. That is, it is 
her aim, in part, to construct correct semantic theories. Correct semantic 
theories are true: to be a correct semantic theory is to be a semantic the-
ory that accurately describes the semantic properties that linguistic ex-
pressions in fact have. So what should the theorist of meaning say about 
the liar paradox? In short, the answer is easy: the theorist of meaning 
should ascribe to  whatever semantic properties  in fact has (and simi-
larly for other pathological sentences). Of course, the theorist of mean-
ing might not know what semantic properties  has; but this is not a seri-
ous problem. There is a great deal of research into truth and the liar par-
adox, and one day, so goes the thought, the liar paradox shall be solved. 
As such, the theorist of meaning may stipulate that she shall simply in-
corporate the correct solution to the paradox into her semantic theory, 
whatever that solution turns out to be. 
Now, consider the cognitivist, who, recall, says that semantic compe-
tence is underpinned by the cognition of a minimal semantic theory. The 
cognitivist’s situation is quite different to that of the theorist of meaning. 
Whereas the theorist of meaning intends to build a true semantic theory, 
thereby specifying the semantic properties of linguistic expressions, the 
cognitivist intends to build a semantic theory that is cognised by speak-
ers. Must a cognised semantic theory also be true? No. In fact, a cog-
nised semantic theory need not even be consistent. Let me explain why. 
Recall that, as I have characterised cognitivism, a speaker cognises a 
semantic theory just in case her semantic module implements the canon-
ical derivation procedure associated with that semantic theory. Now, an 
inconsistent semantic theory can have a canonical derivation procedure 
in precisely the same way as a consistent semantic theory: the procedure, 
given an input (representation of a) sentence or expression, recursively 
yields an interpretation for that sentence or expression. For any given 
line in a particular canonical derivation, the procedure provides a unique 
next line in the derivation – regardless of the truth or consistency of any 
preceding lines in the derivation. That one can classically derive any-
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thing from a contradiction is irrelevant; only canonically derivable theo-
rems of the semantic theory are relevant to interpretation, and only ca-
nonically derivable theorems represent outputs of the semantic module. 
A minimal semantic theory that yields (T), and is thereby inconsistent, 
may nonetheless have a perfectly coherent canonical derivation proce-
dure. Cognition of an inconsistent, minimal semantic theory may conse-
quently underpin semantic competence. 
So, unlike the theorist of meaning, the cognitivist does not require a 
true semantic theory. Rather, the cognitivist requires a semantic theory 
that is cognised, whose canonical derivation procedure is implemented 
by speakers’ semantic modules. And such a semantic theory could be 
inconsistent. Given this, it should be clear that there is no motivation for 
the cognitivist to simply stipulate that the cognised semantic theory re-
flects the correct solution to the liar paradox, whatever the solution is. 
Cognitivism is not a view about the semantic properties of expressions, 
it is a view about the cognitive mechanisms that underpin semantic 
competence; and there is nothing in the cognitivist view of semantic 
competence that requires a cognised semantic theory to reflect the cor-
rect solution to the liar paradox (or even to be consistent). 
It is an empirical question, then, whether the cognised semantic theory 
is consistent or inconsistent. The liar paradox gives us the principal rea-
son why one might conclude that the cognised semantic theory is incon-
sistent. For example, Douglas Patterson claims that
[…] understanding a natural language is sharing with other speakers cogni-
tion of a truth conditional semantic theory for that language which the para-
doxes show to be logically false. (Patterson 2009: 413) 
The thought is that the best explanation of speakers’ linguistic behaviour 
is that their semantic competence is underpinned by the cognition of a 
semantic theory that yields (something like) (T) as a truth condition for 
. As Patterson does not explicitly provide any, here is some brief initial 
evidence that one might marshal in favour of the claim. 
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/9/15 7:04 PM
218 Mark Pinder 
First,9  has non-cancellable content, which is captured by (T). Sup-
pose that Sara is teaching a course on the paradoxes and has written just 
the following on the whiteboard. 
The sentence on the whiteboard is not true. 
(Note that this is , with “” replaced by “the sentence on the white-
board”.) Suppose that Sara says that, in her opinion, the sentence on the 
whiteboard is not true; this results in a student asking whether the sen-
tence on the whiteboard needs to be learnt for the exam. Suppose that 
Sara responds by uttering (1). 
(1) The sentence on the whiteboard is not true. 
Plausibly, by uttering (1) in this context, Sara conveys that the sentence 
need not be learnt for the exam. Suppose now that she continues by ut-
tering one of the following. 
(2) … but you still need to learn it for the exam. 
(3) … and it’s not the case that the sentence 
 on the whiteboard is not true. 
Intuitively, Sara would not contradict her utterance of (1) in uttering (2), 
but she would contradict her utterance of (1) in uttering (3). Thus, there 
is initial evidence to think that liar sentences (such as ) have non-
cancellable content that is captured by (T) – and consequently that the 
cognised semantic theory yields (T) and is thus inconsistent. 
Second, consider a popular (and consistent) view about the semantics 
for liar sentences that treats  as context sensitive.10 Could such a seman-
                                        
9  I use linguistic evidence here and in what follows to draw tentative conclusions 
about the cognised semantic theory directly. Perhaps it would be better to assume 
the meaning hypothesis for the sake of argument, using the linguistic evidence to 
draw the tentative conclusions about the correct semantic theory, and then use 
the meaning hypothesis to extend the conclusions to the cognised semantic theo-
ry. The meaning hypothesis might then be rejected by reductio ad absurdum. 
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tics be captured by the cognised semantic theory? At first glance, the ev-
idence suggests not. For example, suppose that, at t, Mike utters the fol-
lowing. 
(4) What Mike says at t is not true. 
And suppose that, a little later, John utters (5). 
(5) What Mike said at t was not true. 
Then, bypassing any complications involving tense, Mike’s utterance of 
(4) and John’s utterance of (5) can clearly be reported correctly (in our 
context) as follows.  
(6) Mike and John said that what Mike said at t was not true. 
(7) Mike and John agree that what Mike said at t was not true. 
Given the robustness of the intuition that reports such as (6) and (7) are 
correct (the reader may test further cases), this is initial evidence that the 
cognised semantic theory does not treat  as context sensitive.  
And, consequently, this is initial (albeit indirect) evidence that the cog-
nised semantic theory is inconsistent. 
Third, there is some non-linguistic evidence that speakers cognise in-
consistent semantic theories. Consider: if speakers cognise consistent
semantic theories that ascribe a consistent truth condition to the liar sen-
tence, then it is difficult to understand why theorists have been unable to 
find and agree upon a solution to the paradox. (Have they not been intro-
specting hard enough?) Given the lack of an accepted solution to the 
paradox – after two thousand years of trying – perhaps the best conclu-
sion to draw is that the mechanism that underpins semantic competence 
                                                                                                                       
10  See Burge (1979) for one well-known example. See Cappelen and Lepore (2005) 
and Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) respectively for recent defences of the tests 
I employ below. I should note that Borg (2012: 31-32) is critical of using such 
tests for establishing context sensitivity; failing the tests, however, plausibly re-
mains good evidence for the absence of context sensitivity. 
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somehow encodes a contradiction.11 For the cognitivist, the natural con-
clusion is that the cognised semantic theory is inconsistent as it yields 
(something like) (T). 
Let me summarise. Correct semantic theories are true, whereas cog-
nised semantic theories need not be. The problem of paradox states that, 
in light of the liar paradox, speakers in fact cognise inconsistent seman-
tic theories. If this is indeed the case, then it follows that correct seman-
tic theories are not cognised semantic theories: the former are true 
whereas the latter are not. This directly contradicts the meaning hypoth-
esis, undermining the principal motivation for BM. 
There are two broad lines of response to the problem of paradox: first, 
Borg could argue that the liar paradox does not in fact show that the 
cognised semantic theory is inconsistent; second, Borg could attempt to 
show that the inconsistency of the cognised semantic theory is not a 
problem. Let us consider these lines of response in turn. 
3. Line of Response: Deny Inconsistency 
One might be tempted to defend the principal motivation along the fol-
lowing lines. 
Deny inconsistency (DI): initial evidence notwithstanding, it has not 
been established that speakers cognise inconsistent semantic theo-
ries. As such, Borg can supplement her view with the hypothesis that 
speakers in fact cognise consistent semantic theories. Call this the 
consistency hypothesis. Together, the meaning hypothesis and the 
consistency hypothesis are explanatorily potent, i.e. they vindicate 
(E1)-(E3). So they are promising hypotheses, they can be held simul-
taneously, thus Borg can retain the principal motivation for BM. 
This line of response faces an important difficulty. Let us begin by sup-
posing that the consistency hypothesis holds true: speakers do in fact 
                                        
11  This line of response to the liar paradox has seen a recent surge in popularity. See 
e.g. Eklund (2002), Ludwig (2002), Patterson (2009), and Scharp (2013). I brief-
ly mention it again in Section 4. 
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cognise consistent semantic theories. Roughly, the difficulty facing DI is 
this: if (E1)-(E3) are good explanations in the actual world, then we ex-
pect them to have a certain amount of modal robustness; but there are 
relevant nearby possible worlds in which nothing like (E1)-(E3) are 
available; so the explanatory potency of the meaning hypothesis, the 
meaning hypothesis itself, and thus the principal motivation, are all un-
dermined. 
Consider first the following analogy. Suppose that a meta-ethicist de-
fends an hypothesis according to which, in any situation, one is morally 
required to perform the action that one’s parents would desire one to per-
form, were they present. Suppose also that she uses this hypothesis to 
provide substantial explanations about (say) the learnability of morality: 
agents learn what is morally required of them by taking notice of their 
parents’ desires (or whatever). One might be tempted to raise a problem 
for this meta-ethicist: it seems that sometimes parents have conflicting 
desires concerning their child’s behaviour. So, while one’s moral re-
quirements are (we may assume for the purposes of the analogy) always 
consistent, the relevant desires of one’s parents are apparently some-
times inconsistent. Thus the hypothesis may appear falsified, undermin-
ing the meta-ethicist’s explanation of the learnability of morality. 
Suppose that the meta-ethicist in question responds by supplementing 
her hypothesis with another: she hypothesises that, in the actual world, 
parents happen to share their desires concerning their child’s actions. 
The problem is this: it is difficult to see how the meta-ethicist’s explana-
tion of the learnability of morality is saved. It could easily have been the 
case that parents sometimes had conflicting desires concerning their 
child’s actions and, in such circumstances, children would still have 
learnt morality (so to speak). But it would be absurd to suggest that this 
phenomenon – the phenomenon of a child (whose parents sometimes 
have conflicting opinions about their child’s behaviour) learning morali-
ty – is any different from the phenomenon that our meta-ethicist claims 
actually obtains – the phenomenon of a child (whose parents happen 
never to have conflicting opinions about their child’s behaviour) learn-
ing morality. There is one phenomenon and, by-and-large, it demands 
the same explanation in both worlds. As the meta-ethicist’s explanation 
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is not the right explanation for one, it is not the right explanation for the 
other. 
The same point holds for Borg. Recall that we are currently supposing 
that speakers actually cognise consistent semantic theories. Under this 
supposition, and holding cognitivism fixed, it nonetheless could very 
easily have been the case that speakers had cognised inconsistent seman-
tic theories. There is a nearby possible world in which our linguistic be-
haviour is just the same, the mechanisms underpinning that behaviour 
are just the same, but we have been ‘neurologically-wired’ a little differ-
ently, so to speak, such that the cognised semantic theory yields (T), 
and such that our pragmatic mechanisms are slightly adjusted to com-
pensate for the difference. From Borg’s perspective, this is a very nearby 
possible world that I am describing: same phenomena, same underlying 
mechanisms.12 Yet, from the perspective of DI, the explanations for the 
learnability of language (E1), non-cancellable content (E2), and the rela-
tion between meaning and linguistic data (E3), would consequently have 
been quite different: the meaning hypothesis would have been false, and 
so could not have played its alleged central role in the explanations. 
To be clear, the point here is not that all explanations should hold in 
any nearby world. For example, if we explain the occurrence of a hurri-
cane by citing a particular butterfly’s flutter, then, given the nature of 
chaotic systems, we might not expect our explanation to have any modal 
robustness at all. But (E1)-(E3) do not appear to be like this. We under-
stand the lack of modal robustness in the butterfly case: arbitrarily small 
differences to the input of a chaotic system will result, in due course, in 
radically different outputs. But it is far from clear that anything similar 
can be said with regard to (E1)-(E3). Taking the learnability of language 
as a quick example, even if the particular inputs to one’s ‘language ac-
quisition mechanism’ had been subtly different, we would still expect 
one to have learnt a very similar language – and there is little reason to 
suppose that different explanations are required for why such similar 
                                        
12  Why are cognition-of-a-consistent-theory and cognition-of-an-inconsistent-
theory the same mechanism? Because, qua cognitivism, they are the same mech-
anism: there is nothing in the cognitivist account of semantic competence that 
distinguishes them. (And it is not legitimate to use concerns about linguistic 
meaning to inform our individuation of cognitive mechanisms.) 
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/9/15 7:04 PM
Borg’s Minimalism and the Problem of Paradox 223 
languages are learnable. To make use of DI, Borg would have to give a 
clear account of why explanations (E1)-(E3) would not have held, if 
speakers had cognised inconsistent semantic theories. 
Such an account is not easily given, however. Consider two popular 
views about explanation: explanation is subsumption under a law; and 
explanation is specification of an underlying mechanism.13 According to 
both views, we expect the explanations (E1)-(E3) to have enough modal 
robustness to cause problems for DI. 
Suppose that we adopt the view that explanation is subsumption under 
a law. Suppose moreover that we have a particular phenomenon, , that 
we explain by subsumption under a law, . We expect our explanation 
to display a certain level of modal robustness: in any nearby possible 
world w in which  is a law and  occurs, we should likewise explain 
(as it occurs in w) by its subsumption under . The question for Borg, 
then, is this: if speakers had cognised inconsistent semantic theories, 
would the laws of nature have been the same? Intuitively, the answer is 
that, yes, the laws of nature would have been the same. Neither the fail-
ure of the meaning hypothesis, nor the failure of the consistency hypoth-
esis, constitutes a nomological difference: the meaning and consistency 
hypotheses are not proposed as candidate linguistic laws, psychological 
laws, neurological laws, etc. So we expect the same explanations of the 
learnability of language, non-cancellable content, and the relation be-
tween meaning and linguistic data, regardless of the consistency of the 
cognised semantic theory. 
Suppose instead that we adopt the view that explanation is specifica-
tion of the underlying mechanism. Then we explain a phenomenon  by 
specifying the mechanisms that underlie occurrences of . If speakers 
had cognised inconsistent semantic theories, would the mechanisms that 
underlie the speaker’s ability to learn language, the non-cancellability of 
certain content, and the relation between meaning and linguistic data, 
have been the same? It seems that the answer is that, yes, they would 
                                        
13  See e.g. Cummins (2000) for a useful discussion of these views in the context of 
psychological explanation. I suspect that an anti-realist conception of explanation 
such as van Fraassen’s (1980) might help Borg here; however, an anti-realist 
conception of explanation would not sit naturally with the realist picture Borg 
paints. 
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have been the same. Semantic competence would still have been under-
pinned by cognition of a minimal semantic theory, and there is no reason 
to suppose that the mechanisms underlying other cognitive capacities, 
conversational dynamics, the metaphysics of meaning, etc., would have 
been any different. So, whatever mechanisms actually underlie the 
speaker’s ability to learn language, the non-cancellability of certain con-
tent, and the relation between meaning and linguistic data, it is difficult 
to see why they would have been different if the cognised semantic theo-
ry had been inconsistent. So, on the view that explanation is specifica-
tion of underlying mechanism, we expect the same explanations of the 
learnability of language, non-cancellable content, and the relation be-
tween meaning and linguistic data, regardless of the consistency of the 
cognised semantic theory. 
There are difficulties, then, facing DI. The response – which suggests 
adding the hypothesis that the cognised semantic theory is consistent – 
putatively allows one to use (E1)-(E3) in the actual world, but not in 
nearby possible worlds in which speakers cognise inconsistent semantic 
theories. But it is unclear both whether there can be, and why there 
would be, different explanations of the phenomena in those nearby 
worlds. Borg would have to resolve these issues, if she were to adopt DI. 
4. Line of Response: Deny that Inconsistency is a Problem 
The second line of response is to argue that the inconsistency of the cog-
nised semantic theory does not undermine the principal motivation after 
all. Assuming now, for ease of exposition, that the cognised semantic 
theory is in fact inconsistent, there are at least three strategies available 
for saving the principal motivation. I shall briefly mention the first two, 
and then discuss the third in a little more detail.
The first strategy is to accept dialetheism. Borg may accept that, as-
suming the cognised semantic theory is inconsistent in virtue of its ca-
nonically proving (T), then (T) is in fact true. On this option,  
it follows that both  is true and  is not true; triviality is avoided by 
commitment to a non-classical, para-consistent logic that deems ex falso 
quodlibet invalid. I take the plausibility of this response to the problem 
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of paradox to be tied directly to the plausibility of dialetheism – a matter 
that has been discussed at length elsewhere.14 However, let me briefly 
note that a dialetheist response to the problem of paradox would signifi-
cantly increase the amount of logical and metaphysical baggage that 
comes with Borg’s view; this would be a difficult concession, I think, for 
the supporter of the otherwise logically classical and metaphysically par-
simonious BM. In what follows, I put the dialetheist strategy aside. 
The second strategy is to accept an inconsistency theory – roughly 
along the lines of those presented in, for example, Eklund (2002), Lud-
wig (2002), Patterson (2009), and Scharp (2013). On this line of thought, 
semantic competence is underpinned by a mechanism that, roughly 
speaking, encodes a contradiction. These views are too many and too 
varied to discuss here. But let me very briefly note some reasons why, 
prima facie, Borg would be unable to adopt any of the just-mentioned 
views. First, Eklund’s view is, by his own admittance (2002: 260), in-
compatible with truth-conditional semantics. Second, Ludwig’s view in-
volves mentioning, without using, a truth-conditional semantic theory; as 
a result, on Ludwig’s view a semantic theory does not explicitly deter-
mine truth conditions for any sentences at all. Such a semantic theory is 
not, it seems, a minimal semantic theory in Borg’s sense.15 Third, Patter-
son’s (2009) view explicitly involves the denial that any sentences of 
natural language have truth conditions. This is not compatible, however, 
with BM’s commitment to well-formed declarative sentences having 
truth conditions. And, finally, Scharp’s view requires him to explicitly 
deny (2013: 459f) anything along the lines of the meaning hypothesis. It 
seems from the outset that Borg is not in the position to adopt any of 
these views. In what follows, I put inconsistency theories aside. 
The third strategy – which I shall discuss in a little more detail – is to 
adjust the meaning hypothesis.  
Meaning hypothesis adjustment (MHA): the meaning hypothesis says 
that the cognised semantic theory specifies exactly the meaning facts: 
it is the correct semantic theory for the speaker’s language. However, 
                                        
14  See e.g. the papers in Priest, Beall and Armour-Garb, eds. (2005). 
15  See Ludwig (2002), and also Patterson’s discussion (2009: 392-401). 
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Borg need not be committed to such a strong tie. She may instead of-
fer the adjusted hypothesis that the cognised semantic theory speci-
fies all-but-not-only the meaning facts: the correct semantic theory 
may be a sub-theory of the cognised semantic theory. 
We can capture the adjusted meaning hypothesis, as suggested by MHA, 
as follows. 
The adjusted meaning hypothesis: the correct semantic theory is a 
subtheory of the cognised semantic theory. 
On this adjusted version of the meaning hypothesis, the cognised seman-
tic theory may overgenerate: it may sometimes attribute semantic prop-
erties to linguistic expressions that do not in fact possess those semantic 
properties. 
It is useful to see why the correct semantic theory should be a subthe-
ory of the cognised semantic theory. The aim of MHA is to adjust the 
meaning hypothesis – and to adjust it in such a way so as to both imply 
BM, and to support the explanations (E1)-(E3). However, if the correct 
semantic theory is not a subtheory of the cognised semantic theory, then 
it follows that there are meaning facts that are not captured by the cog-
nised semantic theory: but, then, there is no guarantee that language is 
learnable (E1), there is no reason given why linguistic meaning would be 
non-cancellable content (E2), and the clear route to the construction and 
confirmation of semantic theories would be lost (E3). 
MHA shows promise. It parallels a popular view in the literature on 
the liar paradox: that we should adopt a broadly Kripkean approach to 
truth.16 The approach involves giving a recursive definition of truth for a 
language whose pathological sentences (such as liar sentences) are 
deemed not to have truth conditions; there have been numerous sugges-
tions as to how to pick out the pathological (or better: ungrounded) sen-
tences in question. By aligning MHA to this broadly Kripkean approach 
                                        
16  Kripke’s theory of truth is first introduced in his (1975). See Leitgeb (2005) for a 
more recent version of the approach. 
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to truth, one might hope to provide an attractive response to the problem 
of paradox.  
However, there are difficulties facing any attempt to follow MHA: it 
is not clear that the adjusted meaning hypothesis supports explanations 
(E1)-(E3). To begin, consider what MHA says about sentence (1) as it is 
uttered by Sara. 
(1) The sentence on the whiteboard is not true. 
Recall that Sara utters (1) in a context, call it “C”, in which (1) is the on-
ly sentence on the whiteboard and is thus a liar sentence. In C, then, 
MHA shall deem (1) to lack any truth-conditional content. Let me now 
raise difficulties involved in maintaining (E1)-(E3). 
First, (E1). It is desirable to maintain that, even in C, the sub-
sentential constituents of (1) are meaningful; but then, as (1) lacks truth-
conditional content in C, it is natural to conclude that the meanings of 
the constituents of (1), with their mode of combination, do not suffice to 
determine a truth-conditional content for (1). But then, it seems, such 
truth-conditional content is not obtained through composition. If this is 
right, then it is unclear both whether Borg can maintain that truth-
conditional content is learnable, and exactly what (if any) kind of con-
tent is obtained through composition. 
Second, (E2). We saw earlier that, in C, (1) has a non-cancellable lev-
el of content. Sara cannot follow her utterance of (1) by uttering 
(3) … and it’s not the case that the sentence 
 on the whiteboard is not true. 
without self-contradiction. Note, though, that for “p and not-p” to be a 
contradiction, “p” must have truth-conditional content. (Otherwise, there 
is no conflicting representational content expressed by “p” and “not-p”.) 
But, on MHA, (1) lacks truth-conditional content in C: so it is unclear 
how an utterance of (3), or indeed any other sentence, can contradict it. 
So it is unclear that Borg can make use of the adjusted meaning hypoth-
esis to provide a non-cancellable level of content.
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Third, (E3). Given MHA, it seems that there are normal, or grounded, 
sentences and there are pathological, or ungrounded, sentences. As the 
grounded/ungrounded distinction divides sentences into those that have 
truth conditions and those that do not, it is natural to think that ground-
edness and ungroundedness are semantic properties. But the distinction 
is not represented in the cognised semantic theory. On MHA, we (theo-
rists) are using the distinction to divide the canonical theorems of the 
cognised semantic theory into those that are, and those that are not, 
yielded by the correct semantic theory; if the distinction were represent-
ed in the cognised semantic theory, we would not need to do this. It thus 
appears that there are semantic facts that are not mirrored in the cognised 
semantic theory. But then it is unclear both what grounds those facts, 
and what data we are using to ascertain them. 
There are, then, difficulties facing MHA: it appears that the adjusted 
meaning hypothesis does not support (E1)-(E3). As a result, it is unclear 
whether, on MHA, the principle motivation can be saved. 
5. A Challenge 
BM might not require the principal motivation; but it is certainly a much 
less attractive position without it. Coherence with cognitivism is a key 
advantage: it allows Borg to naturally explain the learnability of lan-
guage, non-cancellable content, and to give a fruitful, principled account 
of how to construct and confirm a semantic theory. Borg would do well 
to keep these advantages. 
The challenge, then, is this: to find a construal of the meaning hypoth-
esis that is explanatorily potent – both in this world and in the relevant 
nearby possibly worlds – and that implies BM. This is the challenge that 
must be met if the problem of paradox is to be resolved.17
                                        
17  For useful comments and discussion, I would like to thank Anthony Everett, 
Emma Borg, Alexander Bird, an audience at the PhiLang2013 conference, and 
the Philosophy of Language reading group at the University of Bristol. This pa-
per has evolved out of research funded by the AHRC (UK). 
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